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THE NEW ROLE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SMALL COUNTRIES 1 /
by Dudley Seers
The combination of rising prices for oil and manufactures, 
weak markets for agricultural products and increased 
protectionism in the industrial countries has created 
considerable problems for many small countries of the Third 
World. 'Planning' has fallen into disrepute. But in
the sense of a coherent attempt at national development, it 
is more necessary than ever, though in quite new forms.
A. The weaknesses in conventional 'development planning'
First, let us look at the weaknesses in the old-style planning. 
The post-war colonial 'development plans' were little more 
than public investment programmes. After independence, 
the growing political need to tackle social and economic 
problems required a statement of government objectives both 
in general terms ('reducing unemployment', etc.) and for 
individual sectors (e.g. 'achieving universal primary education' 
illustrated by a set of projections for the following 5 (±2) 
years for selected variables covering the economy as a whole, 
such as income, consumption, investment (private as well as 
public) etc. accompanied by particulars of some leading 
projects.
But the record of such plans has not been good, especially 
in the past few years. Economic growth has often diverged 
a long way from target - indeed, in some cases been negative - 
and even where it has been fast there has been little progress 
towards social objectives such as reducing unemployment.
Many plans cease to have any administrative or even political 
significance after a year or two and fade out of sight.
1/ I gratefully acknowledge comments by David Evans, 
Percy Selwyn and Michael Ward.
There are several reasons for this. Notes on some of 1
them follow:-
(a) Technical weaknesses
The techniqual quality of most development plans is poor.
There is little attempt to distinguish between exogenous 
variables, targets, instrumental variables, constraints and 
the residuals obtained from a national accounting framework.
Moreover, single values are usually assumed for exogenous 
variables, such as export prices in the end-year of the plan 
period, whereas decisionmakers would need to know the range 
and the implications of possible extremes and the nature and 
extent of uncertainty. Indeed, the use of single values is 
one of the reasons why so many plans have become obsolete: 
any major change - e.g. a sharp climb in import prices -
can make them evidently irrelevant.
Few politicians in any country point out how much their
programmes are contingent, especially on external events.
Indeed, plans usually give the impression that the economy 
is far more under government control than it is in reality.
Moreover, most plans are highly aggregative, and thus evade
issues of distribution - between social classes, ethnic
groups, urban and rural areas, coastal regions and the 
1 /interior, etc. Yet these issues are usually crucial to
development. The same is true of the distinction between the 
foreign and domestic sectors. Rarely is an attempt made to 
specify (in plans or elsewhere) targets for foreign capital 
investment, the criteria for its entry, etc., even in countries 
where self-reliance is put forward as a major development 
objective.
Plans derived from the Harrod-Domar model treat investment as 
the determinant of economic growth and rely heavily on 
incremental capital-output ratios (ICORs). Yet there is little 
meaning in ICORs if they cover groups of industries with very 
different levels of technology, less still if they cover the 
whole economy. They are moreover subject to great variation,
1/ A conspicuous exception is Malaysia, where successive 
development plans (since the second) have shown targets for poverty 
groups, and for each of the main races.
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especially over periods as short as 5 years. They can
1 /range from over 15 to less than 2. Indeed, although they
are usually derived from past experience, a major object of policy 
should be precisely to reduce them by choosing appropriate 
technologies, and investing in activities with low ICORs. More- 
over the Harrod-Domar approach is open to a more basic 
question: how can one justify assuming that investment is the sole
determinant of growth? This diverts attention away from many other 
important causes, such as maintenance of existing capital, 
improvements in the health of the workforce, technical training, etc.
The statistical basis for plans is often very weak anyway.
It is impossible to estimate production at all precisely, or 
how fast it grows, in sectors such as agriculture and services 
if there is no regular, at least annual, collection of data, 
especially where much of the sector's activity is not marketed, 
or only marketed illegally.
There are three consequences. First, most national income 
estimates and therefore growth rates are the product of hypotheses 
rather than facts (which lays them open to political manipulation). 
Secondly plans (and policies) using national income data ignore 
what are often the main economic changes - the destruction of 
the household and village economies, which are not at all
adequately measured, and their replacement by a monetised, national
2 /economy. Thirdly, the growth of 'black markets', 'informal'
activities, etc. is also ignored, imps ig a serious bias to policy.
1/ This can be true even for a decade. For the period 1960-70 
the aggregate ICOR was 16 for Uruguay 1.8 for Saudi Arabia.
(TD/118/Supp:3/Rev/1 Trade Prospects and Capital Needs of developing 
countries during the Second United a s Development Decade.
UN, New York, 1972, p.29).
2/ See next page
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2/ (From previous page) There are anyway serious conceptual 
problems in defining the national income in economies where 
many activities are internal to the household or the village 
economy which elsewhere would be marketed (e.g. stream fishing, 
rice milling, handloom weaving, furniture making, nursing, etc.).
(b) Lack of effective commitment
A more basic problem which helps explain the technical weaknesses, 
including the presumptions of plans and the neglect of statistics, 
is lack of commitment to development. Leaving aside those cases, 
not numerous, where the political leader has merely plundered the 
country for the sake of himself and a few relatives and associates 
(e.g. Idi Amin, Bokassa), many other governments do not give 
much priority to social progress. Rhetorical references may 
be made to increasing equality and eliminating poverty.
Governments may even call themselves 'revolutionary'. But 
policies actually operating permit or even encourage the 
concentration of the benefits of growth in those sectors, 
areas or social classes (sometimes ethnic groups) which are 
already relatively affluent. Other sections of the community 
have little voice in shaping the process of planning.
In such situations there seems no role for a self-respecting 
planning office: yet surely it should persevere, making its
projections, etc., until in due course the political wheel 
turns and a government comes to power eager to draw on such work.
(c) Lack of rationality in decisionmaking
Especially where there is no commitment to development, the 
leadership typically relies on intuition, and takes decisions 
on exchange rates, wage rates, etc., ad hoc, without concern 
for their effect on the pattern of development, an effect
which may well be considerable, indeed very often without
1 /even consulting the director of planning.
1/ Thus, when many governments have decreed big increases 
in the wages and salaries of civil servants, those taking 
the decision ought to have received a brief pointing out 
what would happen to port congestion (and thus the rate of 
investment), to the demand for is (and thus the needs for 
investment in roads, etc.) and o wages and salaries in 
other sectors (and thus to the sibility of self-sufficiency 
in foodstuffs and of import su. itution in manufactures, 
unless there were a compensatmc .evaluation), etc.
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This is not to say that political leaders will accept the 
advice of the development planner (or even ought to): they
always take into account other considerations, some of which 
may be quite legitimate in any political philosophy, but not 
necessarily easily quantifiable (the benefits of self-reliance, 
for example). They have the right, however, and even the 
duty to listen to advice on the measurable costs and benefits 
of a particular short-term policy decision in the light of 
their long-term development strategy. What is needed could 
be called 'informal intuition1.
There is often no channel tnrough which they get such advice. 
Many planning offices work in a sort of administrative vacuum, 
neither being consulted by the political leadership at all 
frequently nor enjoying access to it. Some have become 
little more than machines for absorbing the output of the 
economics faculties, and add a pseudo-professional patina 
to government policies which are decided elsewhere.
Rationality requires consistency. The prime purpose of 
planning, is, according to the textbooks, to make government 
policies in different sectors more consistent with each other 
and with the main policy goals. It is only one of the means 
to this end. The principal instrument for introducing 
coherence across the whole range of government policies, and 
thus providing planning with some justification, is regular 
interdepartmental meetings at Ministerial and 'lower' levels. 
For these to be effective, those who take part should accept 
their discipline, not least the obligation to reach agreements 
and to implement them.
Anyone familiar with the way governments actually work knows 
that the reality is often somewhat different. Ministries 
usually treat certain conventional policy areas as their 
sole responsibility. Moreover, a Minister with a personal 
power base that is indispensable to the government is under 
little compulsion to defer to a meeting of colleagues. Most 
planning offices lack the authority to obtain the co-operation
1of the other ministries. In particular, unless they have
strong political support they will be unable to match the
institutional strength of the Treasury which tends to
concentrate on short term needs. Yet planning is hardly
likely to make policy coherent if there is no effective
1 /framework for inter-ministerial co-operation.
(d) False conceptions of planning
Linked to the other weaknesses, especially lack of commitment, 
are various unhelpful characteristics of the way in which 
planning has been perceived. First, the short time horizon 
of the typical plan means that the development issues can 
hardly be posed. After all, decisions on the crucial 
determinants of development, such as the content of education 
or the system of land tenure, or even major capital works 
such as irrigation schemes, are not likely to show their 
effects in less than a decade. Indeed, the transformation 
of society is a very lengthy process. A plan for a few 
years only makes sense within a much longer perspective.
Secondly, partly because of the shortness of the planners'
horizons, critical issues of development such as the content
of education and the system of land tenure mentioned in the
lust paragraph are often ignored - indeed the economic dimension
tends to be greatly exaggerated. After all, economic growth
is merely one among the means, by n o ‘means sufficient in itself,
2 /to 'development1. This would imply now-a-days not just
growth but a society free of poverty, united, peaceful, 
egalitarian, democratic, self-reliant, sufficiently strong 
to withstand external threats, and with the internal dynamic
Usually the only realinstrument for achieving a degree 
of coherence is the annual budget; yet, since departmental 
estimates are in the first place agreed bilaterally between 
the Treasury and other departments, they too reflect the 
balance of political power and the personal effectiveness 
of ministers.
2/ In particular, while increases in some types of output 
are always needed, the national income aggregates conventionally 
used are not at all necessarily propriate. Their price-weights
reflect distributions of income id consumer tastes which are 
endogenous to the development process.
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to continue improving itself in these respects. And to 
achieve these ends not merely economic policies are needed, 
but associated policies in social and administrative fields.
Thirdly, the functions of a planning office are also widely 
misconceived. It is seen (even often by itself) as an 
agency whose main responsibility it is to give birth every 
5 years or so to a plan for publication. The object of this 
is apparently to demonstrate to the public (and perhaps 
to aid agencies) a degree of government commitment to development 
(which may in fact hardly exist). If a planning office were 
actually dealing with the real issues of development, its 
output would principally take the form, not of publications, 
but of direct advice to the decisionmakers, estimating how* 
possible external events or departmental policies under 
consideration would affect the country's development.
Indeed, advice on crucial social issues such as the ethnic 
division of income are by no means necessarily suitable for 
publication.  ^^
One consequence of the belief that the main function of a 
planning office consists in producing plans periodically is 
that the office engages in a burst of frenetic activity every 
few years, putting on one side its other responsibilities 
such as project evaluation, preparation of annual investment 
plans, etc. Paradoxically the work of planning offices 
is often badly planned.
Some policy issues might well be illustrated by quantitative 
projections, and some of the projections might well be put 
before the public. Publishing medium term plans is one way of 
doing this. However, neither the preparation nor the publication 
of medium-term plans is essential to planning properly conceived.
1/ The tendency of technical assistance experts in economic 
and social fields, especially those on 'missions', to see 
their role as preparing reports for publication indicates 
their remoteness from the real proce s of policymaking 
(Would legal or military experts work in this way?) The 
primary role of technical assistance, especially in macro-economic 
policy, is clearly often to assist a government's public 
relations.
B. The need for new development strategies
The case for a thorough reconsideration of 'planning', due 
to such defects, has now been reinforced by recent events.
While the 'oil shocks' and related increases in the prices 
of manufactures, together with deteriorations in markets 
for other commodities, have effectively undermined many 
existing development plans, they have also opened new horizons 
for planning offices.
The effect of the oil shocks
In the first place, most oil-importing countries find that
foreign exchange is a constraint more dominant than ever
(especially the poorer ones that do not enjoy possibilities2 /of borrowing on a significant scale from private banks ), 
and that in particular oil imports need to be minimised.
Short-term policymaking has therefore become primarily dependent 
on the allocation o:: foreign exchange, and costly errors can 
be made if the planning office is not consulted on the 
implications, both short- and longer-run, of foreign exchange 
budgets.
The task of optimising the scale and pattern of imports, especially 
of oil, can be facilitated by elaborating input-output tables 
so as to show the oil and total foreign exchange content of 
different types of final expenditure in some detail. (Such 
tables are by now common; where they do not exist, the oil 
crisis underlines the need to create them). In addition such 
research can be helpful in attempts to minimise the immediate 
effect of the sharp rise in oil prices. It would assist, for 
example, decisions on whether petrol should be rationed, whether 
kerosene should continue to be subsidised (as it often is,
1/ I am referring here to oil-importing economies. In countries
that export oil the need for a coherent development strategy 
is by no means less urgent, indeed in some ways more so, but 
it raises different issues. It is very difficult for a 
petroleum exporter to build up other sectors sufficiently to 
be able to support their high incomes when oil exports start 
to decline. Trinidad, for example, has seen the decay of 
formerly important export sectors, notably cocoa.
2/ "Eurocurrency market recycl .ng of OPEC surpluses to
Developing Countries; Fact or Myth?" by Tony Killick, published 
in The EEC and the Third World: A Survey, edited by Christopher 




because of its importance for rural households) and whether
1 /it is worthwhile to convert crops into ethanol. Such work
can now be facilitated by using mini-computers to re-run models.
The need to simulate the effects of different assumptions about 
oil prices has also now become inescapable. Whether the 
terms of trade become 25% worse or 25% better by 1985 will 
make a great deal of difference to what governments can do. 
Indeed contingency plans are needed for a situation in which 
oil suddenly became unobtainable due to a major disruption 
(for whatever reasons) in supplies from the Middle East.
The implications of the oil shocks for planning offices are, 
however, much more far-reaching than the need for a refinement 
of existing techniques. Fundamental questions are posed 
about their functions.
The outlook for the 1980s
The foreign exchange crises are not transient. While there
will doubtless be occasional declines in the price of oil in
the years ahead, the outlook is for underlying strength
despite conservation, the discoveries in Mexico and the gradual
emergence of alternative sources of energy (e.g. solar power
2 /and ethanol). World consumption is rising, depletion policies 
in OPEC members are more conservative, and the political 
situation in the Gulf is chronically unstable. Yet prices 
of other primary commodities will remain weak until there is 
a revival of activity in the industrial countries - but that 
will hardly relieve the foreign exchange shortage of most 
commodity exporters because it will set the stage for further 
price rises in oil.
1/ All these issues raise of course other questions 
according to local circumstances. For example, could the 
administration cope with petrol rationing, in view of the 
opportunities for corruption? Would making kerosene more 
expensive accelerate deforestration to a dangerous extent? 
What would be the opportunity costs in terms of food foregone 
if crops are grown for fuel?
2/ Especially in OPEC members: the trend of exportable
surpluses is declining in those with 1 irge populations 
(Indonesia, Venezuela and, especially, Nigeria.)
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Moreover an additional problem lies ahead. When a transition 
to new sources of energy becomes economically practical, as 
can be confidently predicted, it will be far from easy for 
countries already in a chronic foreign exchange crisis to 
afford the necessary equipment. This is likely to become 
cheaper but still to constitute a very big burden on the 
balance of payments.
The nature of new development strategies
This prospect suggests, indeed compels, a thorough re-examination 
of the development strategies that were adopted in the era of 
cheap energy, and thus of the role of planning - just as the 
politico-economic changes of the 1950s did earlier. Governments 
of various political ideologies in the past quarter-century 
treated industrialisation as virtually synonymous with 
development and fell into the convenient practice of relying 
primarily on imported technologies. These are energy-intensive 
as well as capital-intensive. Many sectors came also to 
rely on oil-based inputs (especially textiles, chemicals 
and agriculture). Governments allowed foreign life styles 
to be copied, so - in view of the heavy concentration of 
income - consumption also became highly energy-intensive.
This type of economic growth always raised serious questions 
because of its effects on employment and income distribution. 
Moreover in most cases it has led to a chronic dependence on 
food imports. The issue now, however, is no longer whether it 
is desirable but whether it is possible. When the price of 
imported oil quadrupled in 1973-4, this meant in most countries 
reductions in reserves and indebtedness rising at a very fast 
(in some cases unsustainable) rate for those governments able 
to borrow. Some promoted exports, if they could, and reduced 
superfluous imports. Many were forced to cut capital 
investment and social expenditures.
There was a partial recovery in foreign exchange positions 
after 1975, but when oil prices started to soar again after 
the Iranian Revolution early in 1979, a number of governments
r were in a much worse state than when they were struck by the 
first oil price rise. Many of the buffers (reserves, 
borrowing capacity, export expansion, easy import cuts) had 
been used up already, and industries which were oil-intensive 
became hard to sustain. Among the consequences many 
governments put much more emphasis on agriculture and reduced 
consumer activities such as motoring.
These effects have, however, not been parts of consistent 
strategies, but by-products of numerous ad hoc emergency decisions 
of various departments, often taken on very short-term grounds.
The objective need for planning basic structural changes is now 
in many countries overwhelming. This starts with studying, 
partly by cross-examination, the plans and policies of individual 
departments, (which would also make personnel there more aware 
of national objectives.)
As pointed outJSb^ g jpii) . u  fcake far lQnger fchan the few years
of medium-term plans. An appropriate horizon might be about
the end of the century: a longer time span would involve too big a range of
projections of 'exogenous' variables. After 13 years, for example, the size
of the population of working age begins to be affected by births that have not 
yet been made
Long-term strategic possibilities can be illustrated by 
1 /scenarios. These would incorporate some of the elements of
conventional plans, but also show additional dimensions. An 
important one now would be distributional, particularly in view 
of the relationship between income and the oil-intensity of 
different patterns of consumption. In many countries, issues 
of urban-rural balance are more pressing than ever.
In addition, non-quantitative elements, such as the extent and 
nature of decentralisation of decisionmaking, would also be 
covered. Indeed, realistic scenarios would take account of 
illegal activities too (doubtless without numerical precision) 
where these are a major influence on the pattern of the economy.
(No development strategy that ignored magendo, for example, 
would be of much use for Uganda.) Projections in less numerical 
detail would not merely avoid a misleading appearance of the 
scope of government influence over th economy: they would
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1/ Examples of the use of scenarios can be found in the INTERFUTURES 
report, Facing the Future: Mastering the Probable and Managing the
Unpredictable (OECD, 1979).
also permit a proper emphasis on the rural sector, especially 
the degree of its resilience in the face of the 'oil shock'.
(It might be a major aim of development strategy to find ways 
of reinforcing such resilience).
Perhaps the most important dimension of some alternative strategies 
is that they require not merely social changes within a country 
but reassessment of external relations: more autonomous strategies
which are now on the agenda may provoke the hostility of foreign 
powers.
Administrative implications
Consideration of alternative development paths underlines the
importance of continuous contact between political leaders and
development planners, on almost a day-to-day basis. Governments
committed to development will be demanding studies of the longer-
term aspects of various issues, especially those that cut across
departmental frontiers. Development planners need more than
1 /ever direct access to the government. It is true that
such a working relationship will still not be initiated by 
many political leaders, and may even be resisted by them.
But it will be made increasingly necessary by the logic of 
the economic crisis.
Planning offices could perform functions like those of a 
military general staff, which include preparing not only 
contingency plans to cover sudden emergencies (known as 'war 
games1), but also long-term strategies and medium-term plans 
of organisation, re-equipment and training to implement them.
The strategies are sketched in the light of possible changes 
in military technology, according to the expectations and 
policies of governments with respect to (e.g.) relations with 
neighbours and great powers. This requires (and normally 
involves) regular discussion with the political leadership 
about the strategic alternatives.
1/ Naturally, a close advisory relationship to politicians 
implies that such studies will not automatically be published; 
though release of summaries or extracts would certainly in 
some cases help make outside opinion more knowledgeable and 
enable it to be consulted.
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Military planning not merely offers analogies to development 
planning: they should be linked in obvious ways (how much can
be afforded for defence) but also because development strategy 
needs to be coherent, incorporating military, economic and 
social dimensions. For example, an 'open door1 strategy is 
more easily compatible with a pro-US than a pro-Soviet 
military alignment.
These considerations imply that naive -'rate of return' cost
benefit analysis is less use than ever. Factors such as the
extent to which a project reduces dependence (and what sort
of technology would reduce it most) need to be taken into
account, usually by allowing for them qualitatively after the
1 /quantitative exercises have been performed.
Work of this type on development options would require new 
types of staff - not merely economists but also sociologists 
and ecologists, because the long-run problems are now obviously 
not exclusively economic. It wo^uld also need new statistical 
priorities. Since maximising the national income would be less 
significant, that variable would cease to be central to the 
programme of a statistical office. Work on particular sectors 
would be of greater importance, especially on the production 
and consumption of energy (see above). There would also be 
other tasks which would be specific to the country concerned - 
e.g. estimating how much land lay uncultivated (which might 
be available for growing substitutes for imported foodstuffs.)
C . The strategic options in small countries
The choice facing many governments, especially of small countries, 
is bleak. The development options for dealing with their current 
economic crisis are constrained by realities. Political,
1/ Attempts to quantitify all relevant factors, as in
some forms of 'social cost-benefit analysis', lead to
highly artificial assumptions ( e . g .  t h e  attempts of the
Roskill Commission to value historic churches). They stem fundamentally
from a dubious attempt to simplify c h o i c e s  that are inherently
complex.
economic and cultural constraints are implicit in the work
of many analysts, especially dependency theorists. Geographical
determinants of development strategy have, however, been very
1 /little discussed by social scientists of any school. Such
determinants do not change at all, or do not change significantly, 
within say 20 years and limit for any particular country the 
range of feasible scenarios - whether it is ruled by a 
conservative military dictatorship or a revolutionary junta.
One of these is location (especially close proximity to 
countries with overwhelming military power). Another, 
relevant for our present purposes, is size.
The implications of size for planning
Size can, of course, as other papers for this conference will
undoubtedly explain, be defined in various ways - geographical,
2 /demographic and economic. The government of a country
with a small area has fewer options because it is unlikely to 
have a very diversified resource base, in particular much 
arable land - in contrast to Canada, say, or Australia or 
Brazil. Now-a-days the extent of territorial waters is 
also important in view of the importance of fishing and 
sub-sea mineral potential in a country's "economic zone".
Area, however, does not mean much except in relation to the 
population inhabiting it. If the area is small in relation 
to the population (even though that is also small), the country 
will be dependent on imports of strategic commodities, which 
might include iron ore (or steel), copper, wood, cereals and 
livestock products - above all, oil.
1/ I have discussed these in "Development Options: The
Strengths and Weaknesses of Dependency Theories in Explaining 
a Government's Room to Manoeuvre", (in Dependency Theory:
A Critical Assessment, ed. Dudley Seers, Frances Pinter, 
forthcoming.
As I point out there, the tendency of development theorists 
to ignore size may be due to ideological doctrine - some 
of them would not find it easy to accept that, in certain 
circumstances, geographical factors rule out far-reaching 
social change.
2/ Also what one means by 'small'. This does not, however,
affect my argument much, since I am mainly talking about how much 
associations between size and other characteristics affect 
the scope of planning.
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In such countries, unless they offer good prospects of economic 
advance (like Singapore) population pressure has historically 
been reduced by emigration. This has often been encouraged 
by government policy: Malta and Mauritius are cases in point.
But it creams off some of the most enterprising and highly 
skilled people (an effect only partially compensated by 
remittances they subsequently send home). Anyway, the 
opportunities for large scale migration have mostly disappeared, 
through tightening of controls in the recipient countries, 
except for temporary labour permits in countries of the Middle 
East that have small populations in relation to their oil 
reserves.
But, if size of population matters, then population policy
forms an important part of strategic planning. This does not
necessarily mean, as it has often meant in the past, a policy
$of population limitation. If the resource base is adequate
and the government adopts a development strategy involving
external risks, there would be arguments for a pronatal
policy, especially if the economy has been needing 
1 /immigrants. On the other hand, if chronic emigration has 
in the past signalled a shortage of resources, and particularly 
if this is no longer feasible, while military threats are remote, 
the indicated policy would be antinatal. This evaluation 
would determine attitudes to family allowances, and of course 
contraception and abortion. Policies in many other fields 
also affect population growth in one way or another - e.g. 
housing and female education.
The nature of the manufacturing sector is determined by the 
third possible criterion of size, the magnitude of the market,
1/ Even to consider the need for military mobilisation 
and pronatal policies will shock many of those (in the 
industrial countries) working on development problems.
Are there not global dangers in e x c e s s i v e  military expenditures 
and fast population expansion? These are, however, not relevant 
questions for policymakers (or planners) in small countries, 
which have to concern themselves wit t h e i r  own national interests 
until the seemingly remote time when there is some world political 
authority that can provide for their s e c u r i t y  and economic needs. 
(It is clear that the United Nations cannot o th is )  . In a period of strugcrle 
for resources, a great power may even a tta c  a small country that lacks any 
resource interest, simply to obtain the use f a i r f i e l d s ,  ports, etc., to 
enable it to deploy its forces against some completely different objective.
(The German army invaded Belgium twice, for example, to obtain access to Northern France).
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for which the estimated national income can be a proxy.
This is ultimately a matter of population: the national
income equals population multiplied by per capita income, 
but the former factor has a much greater variation than 
the latter.
Industrialisation can hardly be based mainly on a home market
that is relatively small. If it is less than some $US 10 billion
(corresponding to a population of 5 to 50 million, say, according
to per capita income ) it would hardly support industries producing
intermediate products such as steel, aluminium, heavy chemicals,
etc. especially since many of the necessary materials would
have to be imported, and thus paid for in foreign exchange.
So the only feasible development strategy in small countries
with limited natural resources, lies in creating export-oriented
industries or services (in view of the drawbacks of emigration - and its limits).
It is very hard for such a government to create these at all 
rapidly without foreign capital and technology, the main 
channels for which are the transnational corporations (TNCs).
Only in a large country (e.g. India) do local companies 
export, goods with a local market sufficient to enable economies of 
scale to be enjoyed, and overhead costs to be written off.
Moreover, TNCs also provide access to the necessary markets 
abroad. Planning in a small country of this type, in almost 
any sense of the word, is therefore obviously somewhat 
restricted, because many of the important decisions about 
output and investment are taken overseas. Moreover, tax 
revenues depend partly on how much the TNCs concerned choose 
to resort to 'transfer pricing'.
Small countries and large companies
But this does not mean the government need be entirely dependent 
on the TNCs. The crucial need in a small country, especially 
one following this route, is to develop the technological and 
administrative capacity for an industrial policy that is both 
deliberate $nd selective. Typically it is neither. Industries 
that can provide little foreign exchange or employment for the 
country (if import requirements and 'ofit remittances are 
deducted from export proceeds) are o ten allowed to enter,
sometimes actually subsidised by tax concessions, cheap land,
even p o w e r . I n d e e d ,  industrialisation policy may be purely
reactive - saying 'yes' or 'no' (almost always 'yes') to
whatever corporation in whatever industry based in whatever
2 /country happens to send executives. ' The result is a ragbag 
of industries, with virtually zero integration (not even 
producing much for one another).
Technological and administrative capacity are needed not only 
to select suitable industries but to monitor their performance 
subsequently. Many industrial development corporations 
request information about a firm's plans for employment, production, 
exports, etc. before deciding whether or not to grant tax 
concessions, for example, and then subsequently make no effort 
whatever to see whether the promises are in fact being fulfilled.
One element in selective long-term strategy may be to reduce 
foreign influence over the industrial sector, either directly 
via joint ventures, or indirectly through requiring the
/ I participation of citizens in ownership and/or management, or 
lending money to local entrepreneurs to buy their way into a 
sector. (These would be more sensitive to national needs 
than subsidiaries which have to conform to worldwide 
corporate policies).
A purposive industrial policy can of course only be derived 
from an overall development strategy. As indicated above, a 
planning office has a role in shaping this, but ultimately 
what it can do depends on the perceptions and political skills 
of the leadership. There is little point in requiring potential 
foreign investors to justify their projects if the government
1/ Now that the price of oil has gone up, many of theseindustries may involve net foreign exchange costs.
2/ To predict the pattern of industrialisation in a small
country in the 1980s it may well be more useful to study the 
registers of the leading hotels in the 1970s rather than the 
government's industrial policy statements. Contrast Japanese 
policy during the early stages of their highly professional 
inustrial strategy: foreign businessmen who had the presumption
to take the initiative were firmly snubbed.
is committed, overtly or de facto, to an 'open door' strategy, 
or if it is not able or willing to negotiate effectively.
Countries that have industrialised during the cheap oil period
have proved highly vulnerable to recent increases in the price
of oil and manufactures (and associated recessions in the
industrial countries). It is true that the immediate impact
is less severe than on other types of economy, because they
have a greater capacity to borrow foreign exchange from private
banks (Hong Kong and Singapore,for example) and their
manufactured exports have continued to grow, especially to
the Middle East. But their borrowing capacity can hardly
increase indefinitely, and they face rising protective barriers
1 /in the industrial countries.
For them, therefore, as for most small countries, it is not 
easy to devise a plausible long-term strategy. To 'delink' 
to any considerable extent from the world economy would involve 
heavy social costs. Limiting, for example, imports of 
industrial inputs threatens the livelihood of the workers; so 
not merely do the firms concerned resist such policies, also 
the trade unions. It may even be difficult to raise corporate 
taxes (or start collecting them once a 'tax holiday' expires) 
without provoking a decline in production, possibly complete 
withdrawal. Jamaican experience with TNCs in the period
1975-80 illustrates some of those constraints. Various other
2 /forms of retaliation are possible, even military, (Governments,especially 
of small countries, which have not yet linked themselves to 
the world economy, should consider such possible eventual 
consequences.)
1/ Notably the Multi-Fibre Arrangement which may be extended
to small countries adhering to the Lome agreement (a
possibility being studied by the Commonwealth Secretariat). 
There are also bilateral pressures to limit exports of 
textiles and clothing 'voluntarily' (e.g. by Britain on 
Mauritius).
2/ Though such retaliation often seems to be provoked by
rhetoric (especially in the field of international affairs) 
as much as by actual policy changes.
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A self-reliant strategy for a small country?
The range of development options to be considered by planning 
offices is not great small countries which have already
become habituated to cars, television programmes, etc. and 
types of food that cannot be produced locally. (In many 
tropical countries, for example, dietary customs incorporate 
bread manufactured from wheat). Typically a small country
shows a severe incompatibility between its patterns of consumption1 /and production. It is of course the function of trade to reconcile 
these, but, especially in the 1980s the prospective costs 
(in various senses) of dependence on trade points to searching 
for ways of increasing self-reliance. Since on the supply 
side the possibilities are very limited planners might turn 
their attention more to the structure of demand. For example, 
it is absurd for governments of oil-importing countries to 
permit advertisements for energy-intensive forms of consumption, 
such as motoring. Yet restraints on such consumption, and
especially attempts to alter the distribution of income 
significantly, may be incompatible with a government's political 
base or administrative capacity.
A drastic plan of autonomy would, moreover, involve external, 
ultimately military risks, and countries with small populations 
have by definition only a limited military capacity. It is 
true that the potential size of military manpower is less 
important today, in view of the sophistication of technology, 
which requires not so much large armies as high-level skills 
and expensive equipment, but the very foreign exchange 
problem that induces more self-reliant strategies also rules 
out such technology unless it can be obtained without 
unacceptable political strings . If its military equipment comes 
from a great power that exerts influence over its policies, 
it is dependent on spare parts and technical assistance from 
that source; but if it turns elsewhere for arms this may be 
treated as provocative (viz. Guatemalan experience in the mid-1950s).
1 / See Development Strategies are Specialisation in Small 
Countries: A case study of Belize, unpublished doctoral thesis 
by John Wyeth, prepared at the University of Sussex
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A small country with too limited a military establishment 
to withstand attack by a big power can hope to deter such 
intervention by making it expensive. The economic dimensions 
of development strategy (with heavy reliance on a militia that 
could be converted into guerillas), backed by local small-arms 
production.
Other possible strategies for small countries 
However, there are two possibilities to be considered, which 
may extend the range of scenarios in some countries. One is 
the development of service industries, if the location is 
suitable. Examples are banking (Bahrein); tourism (Bermuda). 
Perhaps the contrasts with industrialisation are not really so 
great. Again it may be necessary to rely to a greater or 
lesser extent on the capital and expertise of transnational 
corporations (in banking, transportation and hotels).
The alternative possibility, for some small countries, is to 
link up with others, thus adding resources, increasing the 
military potential, widening the market and strengthening the 
technological base. Planning would then not merely be able 
to show a greater variety of strategic options; the possibility 
would be opened up of cooperation, at least, between planning 
offices, and formulation of coordinated policies (e.g. 
agreements not to compete with tax concessions).
To go into pros and cons would not be appropriate here. It is 
just necessary to make two points in the light of international 
experience about the basic viability of a scheme of integration. 
This depends in the first place on machinery for redistributing 
some of the benefits gained by the larger, more industrialised
1 /members: such machinery has rarely been of much significance.
1 / There has been an attempt in
the Andean Pact to see that the poorer countries obtained some 
new industries. See "A Case Study of Latin America" by 
Ernesto Tironi in Integration and Unequal Development: the 
Experience of the EEC, (eds. Seers and Vaitsos, Macmillan, 1980). 
The fiscal machinery of the European Community has if anything 
redistributed revenue from the poorer countries to the richer.
See "Conclusions: the EEC and Unequal Development" by
Dudley Seers, ibid.
rSecondly, its survival may depend on cultural compatibility: 
moreover, in the absence of this, the price paid by a small 
country for economic integration is ultimately a weakening 
of its cultural identity.
For some planning offices a major task is to work on the 
implications of possible integration schemes in terms of 
industrial structures, educational programmes, etc.
Size and the role of a planning office in a small country
Weaving the various policies into a consistent whole, compatible 
with constraints (internal and external) and with exogeneous 
variables, and deciding what should be put to the particular 
political leadership, is a central task of a planning office, 
but especially important in small countries, where the penalty 
for strategic mistakes can be high.
The government's budget and the number of professional personnel
available are related to a country's size, and in a small country
a highly elaborate system of alternative detailed strategies,
1 /with various time horizons, can hardly be envisaged. The
government will also lack a wide range of expertise to formulate 
and implement policy, especially vis-a-vis foreign firms.
Yet, in a small administration the planning office is less 
likely to remain forgotten, in political limbo. Moreover, 
face-to-face contact between the political leaders and the 
people is much more feasible than in a large country. This 
can provide the political solidarity required for a development 
strategy - especially for the forced self-reliance that may 
lie ahead for some countries. It is, however, far from a 
sufficient condition for this. Finding a way forward for
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1/ However, the need for such sophistication may also be 
less, because there will be fewer options that can realistically 
be considered (see above). Moreover, a small country (at least 
in terms of area) has less need for regional planning.
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a small country, avoiding setbacks but taking advantage
of political opportunities, linking policies to political
reality and inducing support for them, exploiting what
room to manoeuvre there is, requires a high level of
leadership, which is a more important factor than in a large 
1 /country. The work of a planning office (provided it does
not concentrate on 'plans') can be a useful support.
1/ I would not necessarily endorse all of Dorn Mintoff's 
policies in Malta, but he has shown a remarkable ability to 
sustain economic development in a small island with heavy 
demographic pressure (relieved only by possibilities of 
emigration, especially to Australia) but with a harbour that 
is of considerable military and civil importance. Mr. Mintoff 
once told me that the government of a small country had to 
decide what trump cards it held and then play them for all 
they are worth.
DS/BMT 
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